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MAZZARELLI, J.P. 
Defendant Escape Media Group, Inc. developed, owns and
operates an Internet-based music streaming service called
Grooveshark.  Users of Grooveshark can upload audio files
(typically songs) to an archive maintained on defendant’s
computer servers, and other users can search those servers and
stream recordings to their own computers or other electronic
devices.  Defendant has taken some measures to ensure that the
Grooveshark service does not trample on the rights of those who
own copyrights in the works stored on its servers.  For example,
it is a party to license agreements with several large-scale
owners and licensees of sound recordings.  In addition, it
requires each user, before he or she uploads a work to
Groovesharks servers, to confirm ownership of the recording’s
copyright or license, or some other authorization to share it.  
Defendant concedes that it cannot ensure that each work
uploaded to its servers is a non-infringing work.  However, it
has operated Grooveshark with the assumption that it is shielded
from infringement claims by copyright owners by 17 USC § 512,
popularly known as the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA). 
The DMCA, which was enacted in 1998 as an amendment to the
federal Copyright Act, provides “safe harbors” to operators of
certain Internet services, including defendant.  Defendant relies
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on the protections delineated in section 512(c) of the DMCA,
which provides:
“(1) In general. — A service provider shall
not be liable for monetary relief, or, except
as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive
or other equitable relief, for infringement
of copyright by reason of the storage at the
direction of a user of material that resides
on a system or network controlled or operated
by or for the service provider, if the
service provider - 
“(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that
the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is
infringing; (ii) in the absence of such
actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material; 
“(B) does not receive a financial benefit
directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service
provider has the right and ability to control
such activity; and
“(C) upon notification of claimed
infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material that is claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing
activity.” 
Plaintiff UMG Recordings, Inc. is the owner of the rights in
many popular sound recordings that have been uploaded to
Grooveshark.  Many of those recordings were made prior to
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February 15, 1972  (the pre-1972 recordings).  That date is1
significant, because when the Copyright Act was amended in 1971
to include sound recordings, Congress expressly extended federal
copyright protection only to recordings “fixed” on February 15,
1972 or after.  Indeed, the Act expressly provided that “[w]ith
respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State
shall not be annulled or limited by this Title until 2067"  (172
USC § 301[c]).  UMG claims in this action that by permitting the
pre-1972 recordings to be shared on Grooveshark, defendant
infringed on its common-law copyright in those works, and that
the DMCA does not apply to those recordings.  
In its answer, defendant asserted as its fourteenth
affirmative defense that the pre-1972 recordings sat within the
safe harbor of section 512(c) of the DMCA.  UMG moved, inter
alia, to dismiss that defense pursuant to CPLR 3211(b).  It
argued that the DMCA could not apply to the pre-1972 recordings
  Indeed, many of the recordings at issue are iconic,1
including songs from the early days of rock and roll, such as
“Peggy Sue” by Buddy Holly and “Johnny B. Goode” by Chuck Berry, 
and Motown classics like “My Girl” by the Temptations and “Baby
Love” by the Supremes, to name but a few of the legendary songs
to which UMG owns the copyright. 
  Originally the pre-1972 recordings were set to come2
within the Act’s coverage in 2047, but that date was extended by
Congress in 1998.
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because that would conflict with Congress’s directive in section
301(c) of the Copyright Act that nothing in the Act would “annul”
or “limit” the common-law copyright protections attendant to any
sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972.  In response,
defendant asserted that nothing in the plain language of the DMCA
limited its reach to works fixed after that date.  Further, it
maintained that a ruling in UMG’s favor would eviscerate the
DCMA, insofar as companies like it would still need to expend
massive resources policing the works posted on its servers,
rather than being able to wait until a copyright holder or
licensee notified it that its rights were being infringed.
The motion court denied plaintiff’s motion.  Relying heavily
on Capitol Records, Inc. v MP3tunes, LLC (821 F Supp 2d 627 [SD 
NY 2011]), in which the United States district court tackled
precisely the same issue and found that the DMCA embraced sound
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, the court stated that
“there is no indication in the text of the DMCA that Congress
intended to limit the reach of the safe harbors provided by the
statute to just post–1972 recordings.”  It agreed with the
district court that, although § 301(c) is an anti-preemption
provision ensuring that the grant of federal copyright protection
did not interfere with common-law or state rights established
prior to 1972, that section does not prohibit all subsequent
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regulation of pre–1972 recordings.  The court further noted that,
as the district court found, the text of the DMCA does not draw
any distinction between federal and state law, and the phrases
“copyright owner” and “infringing” found in the DMCA were
“applicable to the owner of a common-law copyright no less than
to the owner of a copyright under the Copyright Act.”  Further,
the court quoted the district court’s observation that 
“the DMCA was enacted to clarify copyright
law for internet service providers in order
to foster fast and robust development of the
internet.  Limiting the DMCA to recordings
[fixed] after 1972, while excluding
recordings before 1972, would spawn legal
uncertainty and subject otherwise innocent
internet service providers to liability for
the acts of third parties. After all, it is
not always evident...whether a song was
recorded before or after 1972.’” (quoting
Capitol Records, Inc. at 642).
Finally, the court addressed a December 2011 report from the
Office of the Register of Copyrights, addressed to the Speaker of
the U.S. House of Representatives, recommending that Congress
extend federal copyright protection to sound recordings fixed on
or before February 15, 1972, and that the safe harbor provisions
of § 512 be applicable to such recordings.  The motion court
acknowledged that the report took the position that Capitol
Records, Inc. v MP3tunes was wrongly decided and that
congressional action was necessary before pre-1972 recordings
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were embraced by the DMCA.  Nevertheless, the court concluded
that its reading of the DMCA was a reasonable interpretation of
what Congress intended.
 On appeal, UMG argues that, were the DMCA to be interpreted
as protecting services like Grooveshark from infringement
liability for pre-1972 recordings, section 301(c) of the
Copyright Act would have been effectively repealed.  That is
because, it contends, section 301(c) forbids the Act from
“annull[ing]” or limit[ing]” the common-law rights and remedies
of owners of such works, and the DMCA, if it were to bar
infringement actions against Internet companies that otherwise
comply with the DMCA, would do just that.  UMG characterizes
section 301(c) as creating “reverse pre-emption” of state law
copyright remedies, meaning that Congress is not permitted to
trample on the state of copyright laws in any way.  
UMG further argues that the motion court ignored the DMCA’s
provision that a copyright infringer is, for purposes of the
legislation, “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122"
(17 USC §501[a]).  It contends that, because each of those
sections refers to works which were fixed after February 15, 1972
and so are unquestionably covered by the Copyright Act, a
“copyright infringer” entitled to the protections of the DMCA is
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by definition not entitled to protection with respect to works
fixed before that date.  As further evidence that Congress
intended the DMCA only to apply to post-1972 works, UMG notes
that section 512(c) of the statute refers to a work’s “copyright
owner,” which is defined by the Act as the owner of “any one of
the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright” (17 USC §101). 
UMG then refers to the Senate and House reports that accompanied
the Copyright Act, which stated that those exclusive rights were
the ones delineated in section 106 of the Act. 
Finally, UMG points to the report of the United States
Copyright Office, which was commissioned by Congress as part of
its investigation into extending the Copyright Act to pre-1972
recordings.  It stresses that the report concluded that the DMCA
does not currently apply to such works, and that Capitol Records,
Inc. v MP3tunes, LLC, upon which the motion court so heavily
relied, was premised on “highly questionable grounds.” 
Defendant argues that there is no tension between the DMCA
and section 301(c) of the Copyright Act.  It contends that any
references in the DMCA to “copyrights” and “infringements”
thereof are generic, and that there is no indication that
Congress intended to limit the statute’s reach to works covered
by the Copyright Act.  It further claims that had Congress
intended only to protect companies such as defendant from claims
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by owners of federal copyright claims, it would have so stated.
Defendant maintains that if UMG’s interpretation of the DMCA
were adopted, that act would be eviscerated.  It points to
legislative history stating that the purpose behind the DMCA was
to promote efficiency in Internet operations, and argues that
Grooveshark, and other Internet companies that provide similar
services such as Youtube and Google, would become inefficient if
they had to research the provenance of works before permitting
them to be posted to their sites.  Defendant additionally argues
that the DMCA does not annul or limit any of UMG’s rights in the
pre-1972 recordings, because, notwithstanding the DMCA’s safe
harbor provisions, UMG still retains its common-law rights in
those works, such as the ability to exploit the works, license
them and create derivative works.  
Finally, defendant downplays the significance of the
Copyright Office report.  It argues that the Copyright Office is
managed by a political appointee and so is entitled to little
deference.  Further, it questions the logic behind the report’s
conclusion that Capitol Records, Inc. v MP3tunes, LLC was wrongly
decided.
In interpreting any statute, we are required, first and
foremost, to pay heed to the intent of the legislature, as
reflected by the plain language of the text (see Majewski v
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Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]). 
In addition, 
“[i]n construing statutes, it is a well-
established rule that resort must be had to
the natural signification of the words
employed, and if they have a definite
meaning, which involves no absurdity or
contradiction, there is no room for
construction and courts have no right to add
to or take away from that meaning” (id.
[internal quotation marks omitted]). 
Repeal or modification of a statute by implication is
disfavored (Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v
Department of Envtl. Conservation, 71 NY2d 186, 195 [1988]). 
“‘Generally speaking, a statute is not deemed
to repeal an earlier one without express
words of repeal, unless the two are in such
conflict that both cannot be given effect. 
If by any fair construction, a reasonable
field of operation can be found for two
statutes, that construction should be
adopted’” (People v Newman, 32 NY2d 379, 390
[1973] cert denied 414 US 1163 [1974],
quoting Matter of Board of Educ. of City of
N.Y. v Allen, 6 NY2d 127, 141-142 [1959]).
“These principles apply with particular force
to statutes relating to the same subject
matter, which must be read together and
applied harmoniously and consistently. 
Moreover, as to statutes enacted in a single
legislative session, there is a presumption
against implied repeal; the Legislature would
hardly repeal a fresh enactment without doing
so expressly” (Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199,
204-205 [1987] [internal citations omitted]). 
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Initially, it is clear to us that the DMCA, if interpreted
in the manner favored by defendant, would directly violate
section 301(c) of the Copyright Act.  Had the DMCA never been
enacted, there would be no question that UMG could sue defendant
in New York state courts to enforce its copyright in the pre-1972
recordings, as soon as it learned that one of the recordings had
been posted on Grooveshark.  However, were the DMCA to apply as
defendant believes, that right to immediately commence an action
would be eliminated.  Indeed, the only remedy available to UMG
would be service of a takedown notice on defendant.  This is, at
best, a limitation on UMG’s rights, and an implicit modification
of the plain language of section 301(c).  The word “limit” in
301(c) is unqualified, so defendant’s argument that the DMCA does
not contradict that section because UMG still retains the right
to exploit its copyrights, to license them and to create
derivative works, is without merit.  Any material limitation,
especially the elimination of the right to assert a common-law
infringement claim, is violative of section 301(c) of the
Copyright Act. 
For defendant to prevail, we would have to conclude that
Congress intended to modify section 301(c) when it enacted the
DMCA.  However, applying the rules of construction set forth
above, there is no reason to conclude that Congress recognized a
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limitation on common-law copyrights posed by the DMCA but
intended to implicitly dilute section 301(c) nonetheless.  Again,
such an interpretation is disfavored where, as here, the two
sections can reasonably co-exist, each in its own “field of
operation” (People v Newman, 32 NY2d at 390).  Congress
explicitly, and very clearly, separated the universe of sound
recordings into two categories, one for works “fixed” after
February 15, 1972, to which it granted federal copyright
protection, and one for those fixed before that date, to which it
did not.  Defendant has pointed to nothing in the Copyright Act
or its legislative history which prevents us from concluding that
Congress meant to apply the DMCA to the former category, but not
the latter.    
To the contrary, reading the Copyright Act as a whole, which
we are required to do (see Matter of New York County Lawyers’
Assn. v Bloomberg, 19 NY3d 712, 721 [2012]), it is reasonable to
interpret the references in the DMCA to “copyright” or “copyright
infringers” as pertaining only to those works covered by the
DMCA.  The DMCA expressly identifies the rights conferred by the
Copyright Act in stating who a “copyright infringer” is for
purposes of the DMCA.  Had Congress intended to extend the DMCA’s
reach to holders of common-law rights it would have not have
provided so narrow a definition.  Defendant’s argument that by
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not affirmatively excluding works not otherwise covered by the
Act, Congress was implicitly including them, is simply
unreasonable, and contrary to the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, which dictates that the specific mention of
one thing implies the exclusion of others (see Matter of Mayfield
v Evans, 93 AD3d 98, 106 [1st Dept 2012], citing McKinney's Cons
Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 240).
Moreover, in the same Congressional session as it enacted
the DMCA (indeed one day before), Congress amended section 301(c)
of the Copyright Act to extend for an additional 20 years the
amount of time before the Act could be used to “annul” or “limit”
the rights inherent in pre-1972 recordings.  Thus, Congress was
acutely aware that the DMCA could be used to modify 301(c) in the
way advocated by defendant, and so, in the absence of language
expressly reconciling the two provisions, there is an even
stronger presumption that it did not intend for the DMCA to do so
(see Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d at 204-205).  We make this
determination based strictly on the plain language and context of
the statute and its legislative hostory, and so we need not
decide whether the report by the Copyright Office, which reaches
the same conclusion, has any authoritative effect.
Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that the very
purpose of the DMCA will be thwarted if it is deemed not to apply
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to the pre-1972 recordings.  The statutory language at issue
involves two equally clear and compelling Congressional
priorities: to promote the existence of intellectual property on
the Internet, and to insulate pre-1972 sound recordings from
federal regulation.  As stated above, it is not unreasonable,
based on the statutory language and the context in which the DMCA
was enacted, to reconcile the two by concluding that Congress
intended for the DMCA only to apply to post-1972 works.  In any
event, defendant’s concerns about interpreting the statutes in
the manner advocated by UMG are no more compelling than UMG’s
concerns about interpreting the statutes in the manner advanced
by defendant.  Under such circumstances, it would be far more
appropriate for Congress, if necessary, to amend the DMCA to
clarify its intent, than for this Court to do so by fiat.
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Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County
(Barbara R. Kapnick, J.), entered July 10, 2012, which, insofar
as appealed from, denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
defendant’s fourteenth affirmative defense, should be reversed,
on the law, with costs, and the motion granted.
All concur.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER
OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.
ENTERED:  APRIL 23, 2013
_______________________
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